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Abstract. In wireless ad-hoc broadcast networks the pairing problem
consists of establishing a (long-term) connection between two specific
physical nodes in the network that do not yet know each other. We focus
on the ephemeral version of this problem. Ephemeral pairings occur,
for example, when electronic business cards are exchanged between two
people that meet, or when one pays at a check-out using a wireless wallet.
This problem can, in more abstract terms, be phrased as an ephemeral
key exchange problem: given a low bandwidth authentic (or private)
communication channel between two nodes, and a high bandwidth broad-
cast channel, can we establish a high-entropy shared secret session key
between the two nodes without relying on any a priori shared secret
information.
Apart from introducing this new problem, we present several ephemeral
key exchange protocols, both for the case of authentic channels as well
as for the case of private channels.
Keywords: Authentication, identification, pairing, key exchange.
1 Introduction
In wireless ad-hoc broadcast networks like Bluetooth1 or IrDA2 there is no guar-
antee that two physical nodes that want to communicate with each other are
actually talking to each other. The pairing problem consists of securely estab-
lishing a connection or relationship between two specific nodes in the network
that do not yet know each other3. For example, to insure that a newly bought
television set is only controllable by your old remote control, the two need to be
paired first. Because this pairing is performed only once (or a few times) during
the lifetime of any pair of nodes, the pairing procedure can be quite involved.
The importance of pairing, and the security policies governing such long-term
paired nodes, is described by Stajano and Anderson [SA99].
⋆ Id: pairing.tex,v 1.11 2003/11/24 11:34:49 hoepman Exp
1 See http://www.bluetooth.com.
2 See http://www.irda.org.
3 Note the subtle difference with authentication: in the pairing problem we are not
interested in the actual identity of any of the nodes. In fact, in a wired network the
problem is easily solved by checking that a single wire connects both nodes.
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Fig. 1. Unwanted exchange of information between unpaired nodes.
Sometimes, pairings may have to be performed much more frequently, and
should only establish a relationship for the duration of the connection between
the two nodes. Such ephemeral pairings occur, for example, when exchanging
electronic business cards between two people that happen to meet, or when
paying at a check-out using a wireless wallet on your mobile phone. Because
such pairings may happen many times a day, the pairing procedure should be
fast and the amount of user intervention should be limited. On the other hand, a
high level of trust in the pairing may be required. Therefore, the pairing should
be established in such a way that a high level of security is achieved even with
minimal user interaction. Additionally, privacy may be a concern. Finally, the
pairing should be made on the spot, preferably without any preparations.
To achieve such pairings, we do not wish to rely on any secret information
shared a priori among the nodes. For the large scale systems where we expect
the ephemeral pairings to play a part, such a secure initialisation might be
costly and carry a huge organisational burden. Instead, we allow the nodes in
the system to exchange small amounts of information reliably and/or privately.
Several realistic methods for doing so are briefly discussed in this paper.
The importance of correctly pairing nodes becomes apparent if we study the
two examples just given in slightly more detail (see Fig. 1). If some people in
a crowd start exchanging business cards that may also contain quite personal
information, the business cards surely should not be mixed up by the wireless
network. Similarly, if two people are about to pay using a wireless wallet at
two adjacent check-outs in a supermarket, the system should make sure that
both are paying the right bills. In fact, similar problems plague smart card purse
based systems like the Common Electronic Purse Specifications (CEPS [Cep01]),
see [JW01] for details.
The ephemeral pairing problem can also be phrased in more abstract terms
as a key exchange problem. Suppose we are given a low bandwidth authentic
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(or private) communication channel between two nodes, and a high bandwidth
broadcast channel, can we establish a high-entropy shared secret session key be-
tween the two nodes without relying on any a priori shared secret information?
We call this problem the ephemeral key exchange (denoted by ϕKE) problem.
Here, the low bandwidth channel models the (implicit) authentication and lim-
ited information processing capabilities of the users operating the nodes.
1.1 State of the art
The ephemeral key exchange problem is related to the encrypted key exchange
(EKE) problem introduced by Bellovin and Merritt [BM92, BM93]. There, two
parties sharing a low entropy password are required to securely exchange a high
entropy session key. For ϕKE, the two parties do not share a password, but in-
stead can use a small capacity authentic and/or private channel. EKE protocols
are not suitable for this setting directly, most certainly not when only authentic
channels are available. However, using private channels and with some minor ad-
ditions they can be used to solve the ϕKE problem. This relationship is explored
further in Sect. 3.
Jablon [Jab96] thoroughly discusses other solutions to the EKE problem. This
paper also contains a good overview of the requirements on and a comparison
among different EKE protocols. A more rigorous and formal treatment of the
security of EKE protocols was initiated by Lucks [Luc97], and expanded on by
several authors [BMP00, BPR00, Sho99, CK01, GL03]. This was followed by
several more new proposals for EKE protocols secure in this more formal sense,
cf. [Mac01, KOY01].
1.2 Contribution and organisation of this paper
We first introduce and define the ephemeral pairing problem and the ephemeral
key exchange problem, and show how both are related. To the best of our knowl-
edge, both problems have never before been studied in the literature. Next, in
Sect. 3, we present ephemeral key exchange protocols both for the case where
the nodes are connected through authentic channels and when the nodes are
connected using private channels. In Sect. 4 we discuss how such authentic and
private channels could be implemented in practice. We discuss our results in
Sect. 5.
2 The ephemeral pairing problem
Consider n physically identifiable nodes communicating over a broadcast net-
work4, each attended by a human operator. The operators (and/or the nodes
4 In general the wireless network may not be completely connected and may change
dynamically during the course of the protocol; we can safely ignore these cases,
because they do not change the essence of the problem.
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they operate) can exchange small amounts of information reliably and/or in
private.
The ephemeral pairing problem requires two of these nodes (to be determined
by their operators) to establish a shared secret such that
(R1) both nodes are assured the secret is shared with the correct physical node,
(R2) no other node learns (part of) the shared secret, and
(R3) the operators need to perform only simple, intuitive steps.
The shared secret can subsequently be used to set up a secure channel over
the broadcast network between the two nodes. The generalised ephemeral pairing
problem amongm < n nodes requiresm nodes to establish a shared secret. We do
not study that problem here. A weaker version of the ephemeral pairing problem
requires only one node (the master) to be assured that the other node (the slave)
actually shares the secret with it. This is called the one-sided ephemeral pairing
problem5.
2.1 Using channels to define the problem
As explained in the introduction, this problem can be seen in more abstract terms
as an ephemeral key exchange (ϕKE) problem. In this case, Alice and Bob share
a low bandwidth communication channel over which they can exchange at most
η bits of information per message6. This channel is either
authentic, meaning that Bob is guaranteed that a message he receives actually
was sent by Alice (but this message may be eavesdropped by others), or
private, meaning that Alice is guaranteed that the message she sends is only
received by Bob (but Bob does not know the message comes from Alice).
These guarantees may hold in both directions, or only in one direction7. We
note that the low-bandwidth restriction of both the authentic and the private
channel is important in practice. For instance, an authentic channel could be
implemented by a terminal showing some small number on its public display, that
must entered manually on the other terminal. Sect. 4 discusses more examples
of such authentic and private channels.
Alice and Bob are also connected through a high bandwidth broadcast net-
work (see Fig. 2). In this paper, we assume that for the correct delivery of
5 This applies to the case where the slave is unattended by an operator. A typical
scenario would be paying with a wireless wallet (the master) at a vending machine
(the slave). Note that now the slave has no clue (physically) with whom it shares
the secret.
6 We require that the number of messages exchanged over the channel in a single
protocol run is constant, and small. This, together with the small size of η formalises
requirement (R3) above.
7 Note that in the case of an unidirectional authentic channel for solving the one-sided
ϕKE problem, the channel runs from the slave to the master. See Sect. 4 for concrete
examples.
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η bits communication channel
broadcast network
Fig. 2. The ephemeral key exchange system model.
broadcast messages, and to separate message streams from different protocol in-
stances, the nodes on the network have unique identities. Messages on the broad-
cast channel carry a small header containing the identity of both the sender and
the receiver. Clearly, the adversary has full control over the contents of these
header fields as well. Given these connections, Alice and Bob are required to
establish an authenticated and shared σ bits secret (where σ ≫ η). They do
not share any secrets a priori, and do not have any means to authenticate each
other, except through the low bandwidth channel.
The adversary may eavesdrop, insert and modify packets on the broadcast
network, and may eavesdrop on the authentic channel or insert and modify
packets on the private channel. Note that, by assumption, the adversary cannot
insert or modify packets on the authentic channel. Also, the adversary may
subvert any number of nodes and collect all the secret information stored there.
2.2 Model and definitions
We prove security of our protocols in the encrypted key exchange model devel-
oped by Bellare et al. [BPR00]. For self containment reasons, we briefly sum-
marise this model here.
There is a fixed set of principals, that either behave as clients or as servers.
Each principal p may engage in the protocol many times. Each time this creates
a new, unique, instance Πip. Instances of a single principal share the global state
maintained by that principal. This state is not accessible to the adversary (but
see below).
Communication over the network is assumed to be controlled completely by
the adversary. Interaction of the adversary with protocol instances of a principal
is modelled by giving the adversary access to oracles for those instances. Let P
be the protocol under consideration. For each instance Πip the following oracles
exist.
Send(p, i,m) Sends or broadcasts message m to instance Πip. Any responses or
output according to P are given to the adversary.
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Execute(p, i, q, j) Executes a complete protocol run of P between client Πip and
server Πjq . The adversary learns all the messages exchanged between the
instances, and whether they accept or not.
Reveal(p, i) Reveals the session key generated by instance Πip to the adversary.
Test(p, i) Can be called only once at any time in each execution. A bit b is
flipped at random, and depending on the outcome the adversary is given
either a random session key (when b = 0), or the session key generated by
instance Πip (when b = 1).
An execution of the protocol P is defined as a sequence of oracle calls performed
by the adversary. Two instances are called paired8 if they jointly ran protocol
P . For a correct protocol, two paired instances must share the same session key.
The aim of an adversaryA attacking protocol P is to correctly guess whether
the call to the Test(p, i) query returned the session key of that instance or just a
random session key (or, in other words, to guess the value of the coin flip b used
in the query). Let SP
A
denote the event that adversary A correctly guesses the
value of the bit when attacking protocol P . Then the advantage of an adversary
A attacking protocol P is defined as follows:
Adv
P
A = 2Pr
[
SPA
]
− 1 ,
(where Pr [X ] denotes the probability of event X). To make this a non trivial
task, the adversary is restricted in the the sense that it is not allowed to call the
Test(p, i) query if it called the Reveal query on Πip or on the instance paired
with it.
Each protocol is actually a collection of protocols that must be instantiated
using a particular value for its security parameter. In the case of ϕKE protocols
there are actually two security parameters. There is a large security parameter
s (that roughly corresponds to the size of the session key to be established,
and that mostly determines the advantage of a passive adversary), and there is
a small security parameter t (that roughly corresponds to the capacity of the
channel between two principals, and that mostly determines the advantage of an
active adversary).
In our analysis we will bound the advantage of the adversary for a particular
protocol using s, t and the number of Send queries (denoted by qs) performed
by the adversary. We work in the random oracle model, and assume hardness of
the Decisional Diffie Helman problem.
We use the following notation throughout the paper. In the description of
the protocols, ac is the authentic channel, pc is the private channel, and bc is
the broadcast channel. Assignment is denoted by :=, and
R
← means selecting an
element uniformly at random from the indicated set. Receiving messages from
the channel or the broadcast network can be done in a blocking fashion (indicated
by receive) or in a non-blocking fashion (indicated by on receiving).
8 Formally, pairing can be defined as follows. Let the trace of an instance be the
concatenation of all messages sent and received by that instance. Then two instances
are paired when their traces are equal.
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if client
then p
R
←
˘
0, . . . , 2t − 1
¯
send p on pc
else receive p from pc
k := EKE(p)
Protocol 3.1: ϕKE for unidirectional private and authentic channel.
In message flowcharts,
m
−−−−−→ denotes sendingm on the private or authentic
channel, while
m
=====⇒ denotes broadcasting m on the broadcast channel. The
receiving party puts the message in the indicated variable v at the arrowhead.
3 Ephemeral key exchange protocols
In this section we present ϕKE protocols, for varying assumptions on the prop-
erties of the low bandwidth channel between Alice and Bob. We start with the
case where the channel between Alice and Bob is unidirectional and private as
well as authentic. Then we discuss the case where the channel is bidirectional.
We present a protocol for just private channels, and finish with a protocol where
the channel is only authentic.
In some of the protocols, an EKE protocol [BM92, KOY01] is used as the
basic building block. This EKE protocol is assumed to broadcast its messages
over the broadcast channel instead of sending them point to point.
3.1 ϕKE for an unidirectional private and authentic channel
In the unidirectional private and authentic channel case, existing EKE protocols
can easily be used as a building block. The channel is simply used to reliably
send a random password from the client to the server, after which the EKE
protocol is run to exchange the key. This is laid down in Prot. 3.1. The security
parameters are set by t = η and s = σ.
Analysis We assume the underlying EKE protocol is correct and secure. If
Alice and Bob want to exchange a key, it is straightforward to show that in an
honest execution of Prot. 3.1, at the end of the protocol they do actually share
the same key.
Next we show this protocol is secure.
Theorem 3.1. The advantage of an adversary attacking Prot. 3.1 is at most
the advantage of any adversary attacking the basic EKE protocol.
Proof. Suppose an adversary attacks a run of protocol Prot. 3.1 with advantage
a. Because by assumption, the adversary cannot control or gain information from
the messages sent over the private and authentic channel, the advantage of the
adversary would still be a when given this run where all messages sent over the
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p
R
←
˘
0, . . . , 2t − 1
¯
send p on pc
receive q from pc
r := p⊕ q
k := EKE(r)
Protocol 3.2: ϕKE for bidirectional private channel.
channel are random, independent, values. But this is a run over the basic EKE
protocol, with additional random values added to it. Hence the adversary can
attack the basic EKE protocol with advantage a by adding random values to it
and treating it as a run over Prot. 3.1. ⊓⊔
Note that each execution of the EKE protocol is given a fresh password. This
is unlike the typical case for EKE protocols, where each pair of nodes use the
same password each time they wish to connect. This negatively impacts the
upper bound for ϕKE protocols on the advantage of the adversary, in that the
advantage of the adversary increases too quickly with the number of times he
tries to guess the password. Because Prot. 3.1 uses a fresh password for each
execution of the EKE protocol, the upper bound could be improved slightly if
we consider one particular instance of an EKE protocol in our analysis.
3.2 ϕKE for a bidirectional private channel
If the channel is bidirectional and private (without being authentic), existing
EKE protocols can also be used as a building block. If the channel is bidirectional,
Alice and Bob simply generate two short t bit passwords, exchange them over
the private channel, and subsequently run an EKE protocol using the exclusive
OR9 of both passwords as the EKE password to establish the shared session
key. Security of this protocol is based on the observation that although anybody
can try to set up a session with Bob by sending him a password, Bob will only
divulge his own password to the person he wants to connect to, i.e., Alice.
Therefore, only Alice is capable of generating the EKE password that will be
accepted by Bob. In other words, Alice’s authenticity is verified by the fact that
she knows Bob’s password. The protocol is detailed in Prot. 3.2. Again, the
security parameters are set by t = η and s = σ.
Analysis It is again straightforward to show that if Alice and Bob want to
exchange a key using Prot. 3.2, they will actually share the same key in an
honest execution thereof, if we assume the underlying EKE protocol is correct.
Next we prove security of the protocol.
9 Using the exclusive OR instead of concatenation makes the resulting EKE password
as long as the ϕKE short security parameter. Moreover, it makes the protocol for
Alice and Bob symmetric.
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Commit
pick random x
broadcast h1(g
x) on bc
receive α from bc
Authenticate
send h2(g
x) on ac
receive β from ac
Key exchange
broadcast gx on bc
receive m from bc
if h1(m) = α and h2(m) = β
then u := m
else abort
Key validation
j :=
(
0 if client
1 if server
broadcast h4+j(u
x) on bc
receive m from bc
if h5−j(u
x) = m
then k = h3(u
x)
else abort
Protocol 3.3: ϕKE for bidirectional authentic channel.
Theorem 3.2. The advantage of an adversary attacking Prot. 3.2 is at most
the advantage of any adversary attacking the basic EKE protocol.
Proof. Suppose in a run of Prot. 3.2, an adversary attacks this run with advan-
tage a. The password used by an instance depends on a value received on the
private channel, xor-ed with a private random value that is also sent privately
to the other party. Because by assumption the adversary cannot gain informa-
tion from the messages sent over the private channel, the password used in an
instance of the basic EKE protocol is independent of the values exchanged over
the private channel. Hence by similar reasoning as in theorem 3.1, the advantage
of the adversary attacking the basic EKE protocol is at least a. ⊓⊔
3.3 ϕKE for a bidirectional authentic channel
For the ϕKE protocol for a bidirectional authentic channel we use a different
approach, not using an EKE protocol as the basic building block. The idea
behind the protocol (presented as protocol 3.3) is the following.
To establish a shared session key, Alice and Bob will use a Diffie-Helman type
key exchange [DH76]. To avoid man-in-the-middle attacks, the shares must be
authenticated. However, the capacity of the authentic channel is too small to do
so directly. Instead, Alice and Bob proceed in four phases. In the first phase (the
commit phase) Alice and Bob commit to their shares without revealing them.
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Alice (client) Bob (server)
Commit
pick random x pick random y
h1(g
x)
========⇒ receive αB
receive αA
h1(g
y)
⇐========
Authenticate
h2(g
x)
−−−−−−−−→ receive βB
receive βA
h2(g
y)
←−−−−−−−−
Key exchange
gx
=====⇒ receive v if
h1(v) = αB and h2(v) = βB
receive u if
gy
⇐=====
h1(u) = αA and h2(u) = βA
Key validation
h4(u
x)
========⇒ receive m
verify m = h4(v
y)
receive m′
h5(v
y)
⇐========
verify m = h5(u
x)
k := h3(u
x) k := h3(v
y)
Fig. 3. Message flow of ϕKE for a bidirectional authentic channel.
Then in the authentication phase they will send a small authenticator of their
share to each other over the authentic channel. In the key exchange phase, both
will reveal their share. Only shares committed to will be accepted, and the share
matching the authenticator will be used to compute the shared session key. The
key is verified in the final key validation phase to ensure that Alice and Bob
indeed share the same session key, using the mechanism described in [BPR00].
Only if the validation phase is successful the protocol will accept.
Note that we must first commit to a value before revealing either the value
or the authenticator, or else the adversary can trivially (in an expected 2η−1
number of tries) find a share of his own that matches the authenticator that will
be sent by Alice.
In Prot. 3.3, the security parameters are determined by the size of the session
key established and the capacity of the authentic channel. We set s = σ and
t = η. G is a group of order at least 22s with generator g for which the Decisional
Diffie Helman (DDH) problem is hard. A possible candidate is the subgroup of
order q in Z∗p for p, q prime and p = 2q + 1 [Bon98]. Naturally, exponentiations
like gx are computed in the group G.
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Furthermore, we use two hash functions h1 : G 7→ G and h2 : G 7→ {0, 1}
η,
that satisfy the following property.
Property 3.3. Let X be a uniformly distributed random variable over G, and
let a ∈ {0, 1}
η
and b ∈ G be arbitrary. We assume that the two hash functions
h1, h2 satisfy
Pr [h2(X) = a|h1(X) = b] = Pr [h2(X) = a] = 2
−η .
Finally, pairwise independent hash functions h3, h4, h5 : G 7→ {0, 1}
σ
are used as
well. In practice, these hash functions can be derived from a single hash function
h using the equation hi(x) = h(x ‖ i) (where ‖ denotes concatenation of bit
strings).
Analysis It is straightforward to show that in an honest execution of Prot. 3.3,
if Alice and Bob want to exchange a key, at the end of the protocol they do
actually share the same key.
Security of Prot. 3.3 is proven as follows. We use the following result presented
by Boneh [Bon98], which holds under the assumption that the Decisional Diffie
Helman problem over G is hard.
Proposition 3.4. Let the order of G be at least 22s, and let h3 : G 7→ {0, 1}
s
be a pairwise independent hash function. Then the advantage of any adversary
distinguishing h3(g
ab) from a random element of {0, 1}
s
, when given ga, gb is a
most O(2−s).
Using this proposition we are able to prove the following theorem.
Theorem 3.5. The advantage of an adversary attacking Prot. 3.3 using at most
qsend send queries is at most
O(1 − e−qsend/2
t
) +O(2−s) .
Proof. We split the proof in two cases. We first consider the case where the
session key k generated by an oracle is not based on a share ga sent by the
adversary and derived from a value a of his own choosing, and then consider the
case where the adversary manages to convince the oracle to use such a share of
his own choosing.
If the session key generated by an oracle is not based on a share ga sent
by the adversary and derived from a value a of his own choosing, then k de-
pends on private random values x, y unobserved by the adversary and publicly
exchanged shares gx and gy using a Diffie-Helman (DH) key exchange. Any
adversary attacking Prot. 3.3 can be converted to an adversary attacking a ba-
sic DH key exchange, by inserting the necessary hashes hi(g
x) and hj(g
y) (for
i, j ∈ {1, 2, 3}) and random values for h4() and h5() (this is possible due to the
random oracle model and Prop. 3.4) in the run of the basic DH key exchange be-
fore analysing the run. Hence the advantage of the adversary to distinguish the
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session key cannot be higher than its advantage in breaking the Diffie-Helman
key exchange, which is at most O(2−s) by Prop. 3.4.
In the other case, in order to convince an oracle of A to use the share ga of
the adversary in the third phase of the protocol, the adversary must ensure that
– h1(g
a) = α, and
– h2(g
a) = β
for values α, β used in this oracle. Note that β is unknown in the commit phase.
Moreover, property 3.3 guarantees it is independent of values exchanged during
the commit phase. Therefore, for any value ga committed by the adversary in
the commit phase, the probability that h2(g
a) = β is 2−η.
For each send query then the probability of success is 2−η. Success with one
instance is independent of success in any other instance. Hence, with qsend send
queries, the probability of success becomes (cf. [Fel57])
1− (1− 2−η)qsend ≈ 1− e−2
−ηqsend
With t = η this proves the theorem. ⊓⊔
Note that in fact the advantage of the adversary attacking the ϕKE protocol is
strictly less than the advantage of the adversary attacking password based EKE
protocols, like the protocol of Katz et al. [KOY01] whose advantage is bounded
by
O(qsend/2
t) +O(2−s) ,
where, loosely speaking, qsend is the number of times the adversary tries to guess
the password. The difference is caused by the fact that in the EKE setting,
multiple instances of the protocol use the same password10.
4 Applications
Beyond those mentioned in the introduction, there are many other situations
that involve ephemeral pairing.
– Connecting two laptops over an infrared connection, while in a business
meeting.
– Buying tickets wirelessly at a box office, or verifying them at the entrance.
– Unlocking doors using a wireless token, making sure the right door is un-
locked.
10 This could be overcome by allowing only the first z connections to use the password
alone, and using parts of the previously established shared secrets to generate new,
longer, passwords. Then the bound on the advantage of the adversary essentially
becomes equal to ours.
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For all these applications it is very important that the burden of correctly estab-
lishing the right pairing should not solely rest on the user. The user may make
mistakes, and frequent wrong pairings will decrease the trust in the system. This
is especially important for applications that involve financial transactions. On
the other hand, some user intervention will obviously always be required. The
trick is to make the user actions easy and intuitive given the context of the
pairing.
In the next section, we describe how a low bandwidth authentic or private
channel can be implemented in quite practical settings. These are of course
merely suggestions. There are probably many more and much better ways to
achieve the same effect. The point here is, however, to merely show that such
channels can be built in principle.
4.1 Implementing the low bandwidth authentic or private channel
To implement an authentic or private channel in practice, several solution stra-
tegies are applicable.
– Establishing physical contact, either by a wire, through a connector, or using
proximity techniques.
– Using physical properties of the wireless communication link, that may allow
‘aiming’ your device to the one you wish to connect to.
– Using fixed visible identities, either using explicitly shown unique names on
devices, or using the unique appearance of each device.
– Using small displays that can either be read by the operator of the other
device or read directly by the other device.
Which strategy to select depends very much on the specific application requiring
ephemeral pairing. We will discuss each of these strategies briefly.
Physical contact The easiest way to solve ephemeral pairing is to connect
both nodes (temporarily) physically, either by a wire, or by making them touch
each others conductive pad. The resulting physical connection can be used as
the private or authentic channel in the previous protocol. Or it can be used to
exchange the shared secret directly, of course
Fixed visible identities Here one could use for example numbers, or the
physical appearance. Each node holds a unique private key, and the physical
identity is bound to the corresponding public key using a certificate generated
by the certification authority (CA) managing the application.
The main drawback is that these solutions require a central Certification
Authority. Moreover, the a priori distribution of secrets is contrary to the spirit
of the ϕKE problem.
A variant (described in [Mob01]) uses the fixed identity of nodes in the fol-
lowing way. Any node wishing to connect can do so. Each connection is assigned
14 Jaap-Henk Hoepman
a unique and small connection number, which is shown on a display. The user
mentions the number to the merchant, who then initiates a payment over the
indicated connection. The problem with this setup is that it is vulnerable to
man-in-the-middle attacks.
Physical link properties Depending on the properties of the physical link,
one could reliable aim a device at another, or safely rule out connections to/from
other far away devices.
Operator read displays In this scheme, each node has a small display and a
way to select several images or strings from the display (through function keys or
using a touch pad). An authentic channel can be implemented as follows. To send
a η bit string, it is converted to a simple pattern that is shown on the display of
the sender. The receiver enters the pattern on its device, which converts it back
to the η bits.
5 Conclusions
We have formulated the ephemeral pairing problem, and have presented several
ephemeral key exchange protocols showing that this problem can be solved using
small capacity, and mostly bidirectional, point to point channels and a broadcast
network with identities to separate communication streams.
More work needs to be done to develop ϕKE protocols using only unidirec-
tional channels, or on truly anonymous broadcast networks.
It would be interesting to develop protocols that are correct under less strong
assumptions, i.e., ones that do not require to assume either the random oracle
model or hardness of the Decisional Diffie Helman problem (or both). The same
holds for the assumption on the authentic channel that adversary cannot modify
or inject messages of his choice at all. More research is needed to investigate the
effects on the advantage of the adversary if he can modify or inject messages on
the authentic channel with low success probability.
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